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1.  Introduction 
  Persons who file for personal bankruptcy according to Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy 
code can generally retain some assets. Specifically, at the state level there tend to be 
exemptions for certain asset classes up to certain thresholds. The main exemption is the 
homestead exemption, which enables the filer to retain home equity in his primary residence up 
to the exemption amount. The homestead exemption ranges from $ 0 in Maryland to an 
unlimited amount in 8 US states, including Florida and Texas, in 2006. Personal bankruptcy is 
quite common in the US, with about one million Chapter 7 filings in 2009, and homestead 
exemptions therefore frequently apply. With a home ownership rate of about 67 percent in the 
US in 2009, the homestead exemption significantly affects the financial position of households 
that emerge from personal bankruptcy, especially in high exemption states.
2  
The homestead exemption potentially affects household portfolio choice, as a household 
needs to have home equity to benefit from the wealth protection offered by the homestead 
bankruptcy exemption. This paper provides an empirical and a theoretical investigation of the 
impact of the homestead exemption on household portfolio allocation, and in particular on the 
share of home equity in net worth and on home ownership.  
The estimation uses household level data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) of the US Census Bureau. This data source provides information on wealth 
allocation and a host of personal and household characteristics for approximately 30,000 
households. The homestead exemption is found to have an economically significant effect on a 
                                                 
2 Computed as owner occupied housing units as percent of total number of occupied housing units using data 
from the Housing Vacancy Survey of the US Census Bureau.     
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household’s home equity share in net worth. A one standard deviation increase in the 
homestead exemption level of $ 354,303 starting from a level of zero is estimated to increase 
the share of home equity in total wealth by 22 percent, which is  about half its standard 
deviation. 
The positive relationship between the home equity share and the exemption level is 
estimated to be stronger for households with low net worth, as these households may face a 
higher bankruptcy risk. The home equity share is also relatively sensitive to the homestead 
exemption for households that report poor health, as this could trigger bankruptcy through 
income loss or major medical expenses.  
Furthermore, households with mortgage finance, shorter house tenure, and a younger 
household head tend to have home equity shares that are more strongly affected by the 
homestead exemption level. This could reflect that these households also have relatively 
uncertain financial prospects. 
A positive impact of the homestead exemption on home equity investment is confirmed 
by instrumental variables estimation where we use the year in which a state officially became a 
US state as an instrument for the state-level exemption level. This choice of instrument 
recognizes that, at least historically, homestead exemptions were used to attract settlers to a 
region, to be able to establish a homestead out of reach of previous creditors. A state’s year of 
official US statehood is an appropriate instrument for the homestead exemption, as it proxies 
for the difficulty a region had in attracting a sufficient population to establish US statehood. 
We also estimate a Heckman two-stage selection model, where in the first stage 
households decide on home ownership, and in the second stage they determine their home 
equity share in net worth. This approach yields a significant impact of the homestead    
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exemption on the home equity share, but we do not find a significant relation between the 
homestead exemption and home ownership. Additional probit regressions that relate home 
ownership to the homestead exemption also fail to find a clear  impact on home ownership. 
This could reflect that households wishing to purchase a home on account of a high risk of 
personal bankruptcy are thwarted by a lack of mortgage financing necessary to complete the 
purchase. Households that own a home instead may have more leeway to adjust their home 
equity share to obtain the desired bankruptcy protection, as they can always pay down their 
existing mortgage. 
  The empirical work is motivated by a two-period model of the allocation of wealth 
between home equity and another asset category in the presence of a homestead exemption and 
major expense risk, in the form of uninsurable medical expenses. The focus on medical 
expenses is motivated by work by Jacoby et al. (2000) and Mathur (2006) who find that illness 
or injury and resulting medical bills are implicated in more than half of personal bankruptcies, 
although the expense risk incorporated in the model can easily be reinterpreted as any type of 
uninsurable household risk. The model implies that household investment in home equity 
increases with the level of the homestead exemption, especially for households with low net 
worth, as corroborated in the empirical work. Our finding that households that report poor 
health invest more in home equity, as protected by the homestead exemption, can also be seen 
as a confirmation of the model. 
  Personal bankruptcy, and the role of exemptions therein, have been the subject of 
several theoretical and empirical studies.  In a world of incomplete contracting, Zame (1993) 
shows that  contingent debt repayment, made possible by bankruptcy, can be welfare 
improving. The consumer will declare bankruptcy in states of nature with low income or high    
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expenses, providing some consumption insurance across states of nature. Such insurance comes 
at a cost of a more limited ability to borrow, and hence a reduced ability to smooth 
consumption over time. Livshits et al. (2007) calibrate a heterogeneous life-cycle model with 
US data to investigate whether the ability to declare personal bankruptcy, followed by a period 
of exclusion from new borrowing, improves welfare compared to a system where a “fresh start” 
is not possible. Their calculations suggest that a bankruptcy system that offers a fresh start is 
welfare improving for the case where expense shocks are explicitly modeled. Athreya (2002) 
instead finds that the possibility of consumer bankruptcy reduces welfare in a quantitative 
analysis of the effects of bankruptcy laws in an incomplete market exchange economy.  
  Homestead exemptions allow households to emerge from bankruptcy with positive net 
worth. The effect of these exemptions should be to further insure households against untoward 
income and expense shocks, and to also further limit their ability to borrow and to smooth 
consumption intertemporally. Li and Sarte (2006) analyze the implications of exemptions for 
welfare in a general equilibrium model with endogenous capital formation and labor supply. In 
a model calibrated with US data, they find that lowering the level of exemptions increases 
output and is welfare improving.
3  
  Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) empirically investigate how exemptions affect 
aggregate credit to households. They argue that the protection offered by exemptions increases 
household demand for credit, while it reduces the supply of credit. They find that the net impact 
                                                 
3 Lower exemptions are found to reduce the incentive to save for borrowers, leading to higher lending rates, 
which reduces the amount of debt and stimulates capital formation. With higher lending rates, fewer households 
will opt for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, thereby increasing the labor supply, output and welfare.      
  6 
on credit is negative for less-well-off households, but it is positive for high-asset households.
4  
Bankruptcy protection potentially makes owning a business with unlimited liability less risky. 
Fan and White (2002) find that the probability that a household owns a small business is higher 
in states with unlimited exemption than in other states. Fay et al. (2002) examine how 
bankruptcy exemptions affect the household bankruptcy decision, and they find that the 
financial gain that households can attain by filing for bankruptcy, as affected by the 
exemptions, is a main determinant of the bankruptcy decision.   
  There is also related literature on the determinants of home ownership. Li (1977) relates 
home ownership to household characteristics such as the age of the household head, income 
and family size. Using micro-level data from 14 OECD countries, Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) 
find that the availability of mortgage finance – as measured by down payment ratios – affects 
owner occupancy rates especially for young households. King and Leape (1998) jointly 
consider the home ownership decision and the resulting household portfolio share in a general 
study of household portfolio allocation of US households and find that both home ownership 
and investment in owner-occupied housing respond positively to increases in wealth.  
  Recent work on housing and portfolio composition has recognized that housing is 
special because it is an asset as well as a durable consumption good, and because adjustments 
to housing wealth imply large transactions costs. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) consider the 
                                                 
4 Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) find that homestead exemptions tend to reduce the probability of being denied 
secured mortgage credit. Berkowitz and White (2004), instead, find that unincorporated businesses are more 
likely to be denied unsecured credit or to receive less credit at higher interest rates, if they are located in states 
with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions. Berger et al. (2008) construct a measure of bankruptcy 
protection that reflects the extent to which a business owner’s home equity is covered by the homestead 
protection, and find that larger home equity protection leads to less and costlier credit to small businesses with 
unlimited liability.    
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optimal household portfolio under the assumption that the household is constrained to live in 
the house that is owns and show that this implies that housing introduces considerable portfolio 
risk, especially for younger households with low net worth. Cocco (2005) provides empirical 
evidence that house price risk crowds out stockholdings, and that this crowding out is stronger 
for households with low net worth. Using data from the SIPP survey, Chetty and Szeidl (2009) 
find that increases in household home equity, as explained by higher state-level house price 
indices, lead to a larger share of stocks in liquid wealth. Also using SIPP data, Corradin et al. 
(2010) estimate a model of optimal housing wealth adjustment where house price movements 
are predictable and there are housing adjustment costs. These authors find empirical support for 
the existence of a region of inaction for values of the housing share in net worth, for which the 
household optimally does not adjust his housing wealth up or down.  
  Homestead bankruptcy exemptions also set investments in home equity apart from other 
investments. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to investigate the empirical impact 
of homestead exemptions on the home equity share in net worth and on home ownership. 
Homestead exemptions are found to provide bankruptcy protection especially to households 
that can be expected to need this, such as households that report poor health and low wealth. 
This protection, however, comes at a cost of biasing household portfolios towards real estate. 
This distortion comes in the form of higher home equity shares in net worth for home owners, 
rather than a higher home ownership rate. This informs the policy debate about the desirability 
of homestead exemptions. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role and 
evolution of exemptions in the US system of personal bankruptcy. Section 3 presents a simple 
two-period model of optimal investment in home equity in a world with bankruptcy exemption    
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and major expense risk. Section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The role of exemption in US  personal bankruptcy 
The US bankruptcy code defines two main possibilities for personal bankruptcy. Under 
Chapter 13, which is not considered in this paper, the filer agrees to a payment plan with his 
creditors, typically over the course of three to five years, and keeps all of his assets in 
bankruptcy. Under Chapter 7, a debtor instead surrenders his non-exempt property to a 
bankruptcy trustee who then liquidates the property, and distributes the proceeds to the debtor's 
unsecured creditors. In exchange, the debtor is entitled to a discharge of unsecured debt.  
Bankruptcy exemptions define the assets that the debtor is permitted to retain in Chapter 
7 bankruptcy. Typically, every state has exemption laws that define the value of the property 
that can be protected from creditor collection actions within the state, while there also are 
federal exemptions applying in federal cases. Importantly, homestead exemptions define the 
amount of housing wealth that debtors may protect from liquidation under Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.
5  
In the past thirty years, the United States has had two major reforms of its personal 
bankruptcy laws that have substantially affected the way in which exemptions may be used in 
personal bankruptcy.
6 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a comprehensive reform that 
                                                 
5 There are also exemptions protecting other personal property from creditors. As we focus on home equity 
investment in this paper, we disregard these exemptions that tend to be small relative to the homestead exemption. 
 
6 There was one additional reform of bankruptcy legislation in the US in 1994 that did not concern bankruptcy 
exemptions.     
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established a uniform national set of exemptions while allowing states to opt out and set their 
own exemption levels if desired. Every state had set its own exemptions by 1983, although up 
to this day many states continue to allow debtors the option of using the federal exemptions.  
More recently, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) of 2005 placed three important limitations on the debtor's ability to engage in pre-
bankruptcy planning to enhance the use of bankruptcy exemptions.  
First, the act empowered judges to reverse any asset transfers between exemption 
categories made shortly before the bankruptcy filing. The objective was to prevent debtors from 
exchanging unprotected assets for assets protected under exemptions or transferring ownership 
of unprotected assets to friendly third parties at artificially low prices, only to reverse the 
transaction once the bankruptcy case was closed.  
Second, the reform of 2005 introduced a provision that aims to prevent households from 
“forum shopping”, i.e. moving to states with particularly generous exemptions shortly before 
declaring bankruptcy.
7  
Third, the reform placed a cap on the homestead exemption in situations where the 
debtor has added value to the homestead during the 1215 days (about 3 years and 4 months) 
preceding the bankruptcy case. The pertinent provision provides that “any value in excess of 
$125,000” added to a homestead can not be exempted from bankruptcy. Exceptions apply if the 
                                                 
7 Under BAPCPA if a debtor has moved to another state less than 730 days before a bankruptcy case, then the 
exemption of the debtor’s state of residence for the majority of the 180 day time period preceding the 730 days 
before the filing applies. If the new residency requirement renders the debtor ineligible for any state exemption, 
then the debtor can choose the federal exemption. See BAPCPA (2005), § 522(b)(3).  
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additional value was transferred from another homestead within the same state, or if the 
homestead is the principal residence of a family farmer.
8  
The number of Chapter 7 filings peaked at about 1.4 million in 2005 before falling to 
about 400,000 in 2006, as households apparently tried to take advantage of the more favorable 
rules before BAPCPA was enacted. By 2009, the number of Chapter 7 filings had increased 
back to a level of about 1 million, which indicates that bankruptcy exemptions remain very 
relevant even after the reform of 2005. 
Table 1 presents data on homestead exemptions for the 50 US states and DC, with the 
federal homestead exemption at the bottom of the table. We present data for 1996, and for each 
of the years 2000-2006, corresponding to our sample period of 1996-2006 in the estimation 
below. We coded the state exemption level to the federal exemption, if the state permits the use 
of the federal exemption and the state exemption is lower than the federal exemption.
9 The 
table shows considerable cross-sectional variation in homestead exemptions, with Maryland 
applying an exemption of zero, and 8 states, including Florida and Texas, applying an unlimited 
exemption in 2006. If the exemption is unlimited, the household can retain its primary 
residence fully in bankruptcy regardless of its value. In the empirical work below, we code 
unlimited exemptions to a value of one million dollars in 2000, adjusting this amount for other 
years to reflect price level variation. 
                                                 
8 Thus, the cap applies in situations where a debtor has purchased a new homestead in a different state, or where 
the debtor has increased the value to his homestead through a renovation or addition. See BAPCPA (2005), § 
522(p). 
9 This applies to, for instance, Hawaii, Michigan, and New Jersey.    
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Comparing homestead exemptions in 1996 and 2006, we see that most states increased 
exemption levels to some extent to offset inflation and maintain the real value of the 
exemptions. Several states, however, made more significant changes in their homestead 
exemptions. Rhode Island, for example, increased its exemption amount from $30,000 in 1996 
to $300,000 in 2006, DC moved from the federal homestead exemption to an unlimited 
exemption in 2006, and Delaware changed from a zero homestead exemption to an exemption 
of $50,000 in 2006 given that Delaware does not permit the use of the federal exemption. Thus, 
there is some time variation in homestead exemption levels, in addition to considerable cross-
state variation. 
 
3.  A model of home equity investment with bankruptcy exemption 
  To motivate subsequent empirical work, this section sets out a simple two-period model 
of wealth allocation in the presence of major expense risk. In the first period, the representative 
individual allocates his wealth W between two categories. First, the individual can invest in a 
wealth category H, that is covered by a bankruptcy exemption X > 0 in case of a second-period 
bankruptcy.  We will refer to H as housing, even though in practice other assets can be covered 
by an exemption as well, including clothing, furniture and pension rights. The bankruptcy 
exemption X includes any homestead exemption covering the home equity in a primary 
residence. The second wealth category, denoted B, represents all asset classes that are not 
potentially covered by an exemption. We will refer to B as bonds. 
The wealth categories, B and H, differ in two respects. First, the protected wealth 
category, H, is taken to be a consumption good as well as an asset, while B is only an asset. The 
wealth category H, in particular, includes owner-occupied housing, which is both a    
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consumption good and an asset. Second, we assume that asset B dominates asset H in its 
investment return. Assets included in B, specifically, provide a return of r > 0, while the 
investment return on H is set to zero for simplicity.  
With probability π, the agent faces a major expense in the second period, denoted M, 
which can be thought of as an uninsurable medical expense. We assume that M > W(1 + r) so 
that the medical expense will exhaust the individual’s second-period wealth and trigger a 
personal bankruptcy, even if he previously invested only in higher yielding bonds.
10 Second-
period wealth after any payment towards the medical bill is used for second-period, non-
housing consumption, C. With probability 1 – π, the agent does not face a medical bill and his 
consumption C equals B(1 + r) + H. With probability π, the individual, instead, consumes 
min[H, X], as X is the maximum wealth protection offered by the exemption. We will assume 
1 ) 1 )( 1 ( > + − r π to not exclude the possibility that the individual jointly holds bonds and housing 
less than the exemption. 
Utility derived from housing and non-housing consumption, U(H, C), is taken to be 
separable so that it can be written as V(H) + Z(C), with the Inada conditions applying.
11 In the 
first period, the agent chooses B and H so as to maximize expected utility, EU, written as
12 
                                                 
10 We can assume that a government program will cover the part of the medical bill that the individual cannot 
pay. Such a government program can be thought to be financed by a first-period tax τ on an endowment Y, with 
W = (1 – τ)Y being the after-tax endowment or wealth. The government budget is then given by  
))] 0 , max( ) 1 ( ( [ ) 1 ( X H r B M Y r − + + − = + π τ  
with r also representing the return on government surplus. The representative individual considers the tax rate τ 
as given. 
11 These are  , 0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' , 0 ) 0 ( < > = H V H V V , ) ( ' lim 0 ∞ = → H V H and  0 ) ( ' lim = ∞ → H V H , with 
analogous conditions applying to Z(C).    
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)) , (min( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( X H Z H r B Z H V EU π π + + + − + =          (1) 
subject to the wealth constraint W = B + H, and to B ≥ 0 to prevent ‘strategic’ first-period 
borrowing to invest in the protected housing asset.  
  The marginal contributions of investments in bonds and housing to expected utility EU 
can be written as follows    
  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( H r B Z r
dB
dEU
+ + + − = π               (2) 
) ( ' ) , ( ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' H Z X H i H r B Z H V
dH
dEU
π π + + + − + =         (3) 
where i(H, X ) is an index function that equals 1 if H < X and 0 if H > X. A marginal 
investment in bonds is seen to add to second-period, non-housing consumption only in the 
absence of the medical expense. A marginal investment in housing also adds to second-period, 
non-housing consumption without the medical expense, and in addition if there is a medical 
expense and housing is fully covered by the exemption, i.e. H < X.  
  The first order conditions (2) and (3) imply two scenarios in which the agent is at the 
margin indifferent between allocating his wealth to bonds and to housing. First, the investment 






with H > X which implies 
) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( rH r W Z r − + + −π =  ) ( ' H V + ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( rH r W Z − + −π                  (4) 
where W – H has been substituted for B. 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 In this specification, housing consumption can be taken to occur in either period or in both periods, with any 
discounting of utility from second-period consumption implicit in the subutility functions V and Z.    
  14 
  The relationship between W and H implicit in (4) is pictured as the ‘no protection’ line, 
labeled NP, in Figure 1. This schedule is upward sloping as (4) implies  
0
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 >
− + − +
− + + −
=
rH r W Z r H V





where H ≤ W as B ≥ 0.  We consider the case where along the NP schedule 
) ( '
) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( '
) ) 1 ( ( ' '
H V
H V
rH r W Z
rH r W Z
>
− +
− + , which means that the marginal utility of housing consumption 
declines relatively fast. In this case, we have dH/dW < 1 so that the NP schedule has a slope of 
less than one in Figure 1, and it starts at the origin.
13  
  Second, the individual can be indifferent between investing in bonds and housing for the 
case where housing wealth is fully exempted from bankruptcy in the bad state. From (3) and 





=  with H < X implies 
  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( rH r W Z r − + + −π  =   ) ( ' H V +  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( rH r W Z − + −π + ) ( ' H Z π    (5) 
  The relationship between W and H implicit in (5) is now pictured as the ‘protection’ 
line, labeled P, in Figure 1. This schedule is upward sloping as (5) implies  
  0
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) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 >
− + − + +
− + + −
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rH r W Z r H Z H V





where H ≤ W as B ≥ 0.  We further assume that along the P schedule we have 
                                                 
13 The provided condition and (4) imply dH/dW < 1.    
  15 
) ( ' ' ) ( '
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H Z H V
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− +  (a relatively fast decline of the marginal utility of housing 
consumption) to guarantee dH/dW < 1.
14 The P schedule thus has a slope of less than one, and it 
meets the 45
o line with wealth equal to Wp as implicit in  ) ( ' p W V = ) ( ' ] 1 ) 1 )( 1 [( p W Z r − + −π . Note 











<  for same H and W and with H < 
X  in (5). This implies Wp  > 0. 
  Next, we consider how the optimal investment in housing H varies with the individual’s 
wealth, W. With the Inada conditions applying, the agent allocates his entire wealth to 
‘housing’ to guarantee some second-period, non-housing consumption at very low levels of 
wealth.
15 At a certain higher level of wealth, the individual start to invest jointly in bonds and in 
housing.  
We can now distinguish two possible overall relationships between wealth and housing, 
depending on the size of the exemption, X, relative to the wealth levels at which the individual 
starts to invest in bonds with the housing investment protected, denoted Wp.  
 
Case A: X > Wp  (weak preference for housing consumption) 
                                                 
14 This condition and (5) imply dH/dW < 1. 
15 Note that the wealth insurance offered by the exemption is valuable to the individual as without it he obtains 
a subutility Z of zero with probability π. However, this insurance comes at a cost of biasing consumption 
towards housing if a housing allocation is chosen above the NP schedule. The optimal level of the exemption X 
in this model is not considered.    
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  This is a case of a weak relative preference for housing consumption, as the individual 
starts to invest jointly in bonds and housing at a level of wealth Wp below the exemption X.  
The overall relationship between wealth and housing is now pictured in Figure 2, Panel 
A. For wealth levels up to Wp, the individual just holds housing. At that point, the investor 
starts to invest jointly in both bonds and housing, along the P schedule. Housing continues to 
rise with wealth until housing equals the exemption level, i.e. H = X. At that point, the marginal 
contribution of higher housing to expected utility (i.e., 
dH
dEU  for H rising) drops, as any further 
investment in housing no longer adds to second-period, non-housing consumption in the bad 
state. Therefore, the individual starts to invest at the margin only in bonds until the NP schedule 
is reached at a wealth levelW ˆ .
16 At that wealth level, the individual starts to invest jointly in 
bonds and housing again, along the NP schedule. For wealth levels below W ˆ in the figure, the 
individual is seen to hold additional wealth in the form of housing on account of an housing 
exemption that covers the marginal investment in housing.  
 
Case B:  X Wp ≥  (strong preference for housing consumption) 
  This is a case of a strong preference for housing consumption, as the individual starts to 
invest jointly in bonds and housing at a wealth level equal to the exemption. 
The relationship between wealth and housing is now presented in Figure 2, Panel B. For 
wealth levels up to X the investor just holds housing. At that point, any further investment in 
housing ceases to add to second-period, non-housing consumption in the bad state. Therefore, 
                                                 
16 Using (4) we can find W ˆ  implicitly from  ) ( ' ) ) 1 ( ˆ ( ' ) 1 ( X V X r W rZ = − + −π .    
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the investor only invests in bonds at the margin as wealth increases until the NP schedule is 
reached at a wealth level W ˆ . For higher wealth levels, the investor invests jointly in bonds and 
housing, along the NP schedule. For wealth below W ˆ , the individual is now seen to maintain a 
higher housing investment on account of the exemption. 
  In both panels of Figure 2, the marginal investment in housing, dH/dW,  is higher at the 
lowest levels of wealth than it is at very high levels of wealth. In addition, there is a range of 
wealth levels where the marginal investment in housing is zero. 
  To conclude the discussion of the model, we consider the impact of a change in the 
exemption level X on the wealth allocation for individuals with different wealth levels. 
Specifically, let us consider a (small) rise in the exemption X from X1 to X2. Graphically, the 
increase in X will affect the position of the horizontal line segment, at housing level H equal to 
X, in Panels A and B of Figure 2. To illustrate, in Figure 3 we picture the horizontal line 
segments at housing levels X1 and X2 for case B as depicted in Panel B of Figure 2. In the 
figure, we see that the increase in the exemption only affects the wealth allocation between 
housing and bonds for individuals with wealth levels between  1 X  and  2 ˆ W . For these 
individuals, the higher exemption is seen to lead to a greater allocation of wealth towards the 
protected housing category. For individuals with either lower or higher wealth, the wealth 
allocation between bonds and housing, however, is not affected by the increase in the 
exemption level X. 
The empirical work below tests some key aspects of the model. Specifically, the share 
of household wealth that is allocated to home equity is expected to increase with the level of the 
homestead exemption, especially for households with low net worth. The positive relationship    
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between the homestead exemption and home equity investments is predicated on the existence 
of some bankruptcy risk. Poor health poses a major risk, as it can lead to income loss or 
catastrophic medical bills as modeled in this section. Therefore, we also investigate whether the 
positive impact of the homestead exemption on home equity investment is stronger if the 
household head is in poor health. 
 
4.   The data 
  We use household data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation of the US 
Census Bureau that at each moment tracks about 30,000 households. Our sample period is from 
1996 to 2006. During this period, information was collected from three consecutive groups of 
households or panels that were interviewed during the years 1996-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-
2006, respectively. During its active period, each panel is interviewed many times with 
intervals of several months, while panels of households do not overlap across periods. During a 
calendar year, the households in a panel are typically asked to answer different questions at 
different times, with for our purposes no repetition of the same relevant question within a 
calendar year. This enables us to organize the data by calendar year, yielding at least 2 usable 
years of data per panel and with some households moving between states and thus subject to 
different state homestead exemptions in our sample. 
  The SIPP collects information on home ownership, home value and mortgage debt, as 
well as on a wide range of other real and financial assets and liabilities. The SIPP thus is well 
suited to study household portfolio allocation, and in particular the share of a household’s net 
worth that is held in the form of home equity in the household’s primary residence. As we 
know whether a household owns its home, the underlying home ownership decision can be    
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examined as well. The SIPP, in addition, contains other information on household composition 
and characteristics that can be considered to affect the home equity investment decision. 
  A first variable used in this study is Own, which is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if the household owns its residence, and it is zero otherwise (see the Appendix for 
variable definitions and data sources). The mean ownership rate in our sample is 67.3 percent 
as seen in Table 2, which provides summary statistics on main variables. The mean Home 
equity, computed as house value minus mortgage debt, is seen to be $ 63,745. Total average 
household net worth amounts o $ 155,671. Home equity share is the ratio of home equity to net 
worth, and it is computed only for households with positive net worth. The mean home equity 
share amounts to 0.58.  
  A key household characteristic is the variable Age, which is the age of the household 
head. A household’s home equity can be expected to increase with age, as mortgage debt tends 
to be paid down over time. Health also potentially increases a household’s investment in 
exempted home equity. Our Health variable stands for the health status of the household head, 
and it ranges from value of 1 for poor health to 5 for excellent health, with an average health 
rating of 3.6 (between good and very good). Members is the number of individual household 
members, with a mean value of 2.6. A larger family is expected to own a larger and more 
expensive residence. Married is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the household 
head is married, and zero otherwise. Marriage may signal household stability promoting home 
ownership. 
  Moved state is an indicator for whether the household moved to another state during the 
previous year. Households that move state typically are subject to different state homestead 
exemption regimes during the years that they are included in the sample. Exemption is the    
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dollar amount of the homestead exemption. The level is set to 1 millions dollars in case the 
exemption is unlimited in 2000, adjusting this amount in other years for inflation. With this 
adjustment, we get an average exemption level of $ 208,066. Log exemption is the natural 
logarithm of the value of the exemption plus one. Appreciation is the state-level annual rate of 
appreciation of the deflated house price index constructed by the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight. The mean rate of real house price appreciation is 3.8 percent in our 
sample.  
Statehood is the year in which a state officially became a US state. The year of 
statehood is an index of how difficult it was to settle a part of the US, either because of 
unfavorable natural circumstances or distance from the original colonies. As documented by 
Goodman (1993), homestead exemptions were used to attract indebted settlers to mainly 
uninhabited areas, as these exemptions allowed people to acquire a new home out of reach of 
previous creditors. The regions that were more difficult to settle required higher homestead 
exemptions to be attractive to potential settlers. The difficulty to settle a region, as proxied by a 
state’s year of official US statehood, thus can be seen as one of the historical determinants of 
homestead exemption levels. Hynes, Malani and Posner (2004) document that state-level 
exemption levels have been quite persistent, which suggests that current exemption levels still 
reflect the determinants of historical exemption levels. The mean year of US statehood for our 
sample is 1827. 
 
5.  Empirical results   
  We examine whether homestead exemptions affect household portfolio allocation, and 
in particular the ratio of home equity to total household net worth. We first estimate a    
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regression model with the ratio of home equity to total household net worth as dependent 
variable and a host of household and state-level characteristics, including applicable homestead 
exemption levels, as explanatory variables. The regressions of the home equity share reported 
in Table 3 all include state and year fixed effects and errors are clustered at the household level. 
In regression 1, the Log exemption variable obtains a coefficient of 0.017 that is significant at 
the 1 percent level. To interpret this coefficient, we can consider a one standard deviation 
increase in Exemption of $ 354,303, starting from a level of zero. This will increase the home 
equity share by 0.22, which amounts to about half its standard deviation of 0.462 (from Table 
2). Thus, the impact of the actual variation of homestead exemption levels, as reflected in Table 
1, on the home equity share is estimated to be economically significant. 
  In regression 1, the home equity share is further positively and significantly related to 
home price appreciation. The Age variable also enters with a positive and significant coefficient 
which can reflect that older households benefited from longer periods of house price 
appreciation, or that they have had more time to pay down their mortgages. The Health variable 
obtains a negative and significant coefficient. Households with healthier household heads could 
invest less in home equity partly because they are less in need of any exemption from 
bankruptcy. The Members variable obtains a positive and significant coefficient, reflecting that 
larger families are more likely to own more expensive homes. 
  Next, we restrict the sample to households that own their home because we do not 
observe home equity for households without a home. In regression 2, the Log exemption 
variable now obtains a slightly higher coefficient of 0.018 that remains significant at the 1 
percent level. Starting from regression 2, we include the Log net worth in regression 3  as an 
additional control variable, as a household’s home equity share may vary with household    
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wealth due to the operation of the housing finance market (in particular, the need to make a 
down payment out of own funds when purchasing a home) and due to preferences. In 
regression 3, the Log exemption variable now obtains a slightly higher coefficient of 0.025 that 
is significant at the 1 percent level. The Log net worth variable obtains a negative coefficient of 
-0.156 that is significant at the 1 percent level, which may reflect preferences of richer 
households to maintain a lower share of their wealth in the form of home equity. In addition, 
regression 4 includes the square of the Log net worth variable. The estimated coefficient for the 
Log exemption variable is virtually unchanged, while the linear and quadratic Log net worth 
variables now obtain positive and negative coefficients, respectively, that are both significant at 
the 1 percent level. Apparently, the home equity share first rises and then declines with the Log 
net worth variable.  
Regression 5 in addition includes an interaction variable of Log exemption and Log net 
worth. Now the Log exemption variable obtains a larger coefficient of 0.068 that is significant 
at the 1 percent level, while the interaction variable obtains a negative coefficient of -0.004 that 
is also significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, the positive impact of the homestead exemption 
on the home equity share declines with net worth. The estimated coefficients on the Log 
exemption variable and its interaction with Log net worth suggest that the impact of a higher 
exemption on the home equity share could turn negative in principle for households with a Log 
net worth above 17 (or net worth above $ 21.5 million). In the sample of regression 5, however, 
there is only a negligibly small number of observations with household wealth above this level. 
We therefore conclude that the impact of the homestead exemption on the home equity share is 
positive and decreasing in net worth.    
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This could reflect that the wealth protection offered by the homestead exemption biases 
investment portfolios of wealthy households less towards home equity, as these households 
face a lower probability of bankruptcy. Alternatively, wealthier households have to bias their 
home equity share less towards home equity to obtain the same level increase in home equity as 
protected by the homestead exemption.  To differentiate between these alternative explanations, 
in regressions 6 and 7 of Table 3 we split the sample between high-wealth households, defined 
as households with net wealth in excess of US$500,000 of 2000 US dollars, and non-high-
wealth households. For high-wealth households, exemption levels are more likely to be binding 
the amount of wealth insurance that they can obtain, which would suggest we should find that 
home equity shares are more sensitive to exemption levels for the wealthy. On the other hand, if 
wealthy households face a lower risk of bankruptcy, then the sensitivity with respect to 
exemption levels should be lower for wealthy households. We find that exemption levels only 
affect home equity shares for non-wealthy households. This suggests that the sensitivity of the 
home equity share to the homestead exemption declines in net worth because wealthy 
households face a lower risk of bankruptcy. 
Next, we consider whether the sensitivity of a household’s home equity share to the 
exemption level depends on the household head’s age and health. First, in regression 1 of Table 
4 we include an interaction variable of Log exemption and Log age, starting from regression 5 
of Table 3. Now the Log exemption obtains a higher coefficient of 0.087 that remains 
significant at 1 percent, while the interaction variable obtains a negative coefficient of -0.006 
that is significant at 1 percent. Thus, the positive impact of the homestead exemption on the 
home equity share is smaller for older households. Potential reasons are that older households 
move less frequently and thus have fewer opportunities to adjust the value of their home to their    
  24 
optimal home equity share, and that they are more likely to have paid down their initial 
mortgage.
17 
  Next, regression 2, instead, includes an interaction variable of the Log exemption 
variable and the Health variable. Good health is expected to reduce the demand for home equity 
in household portfolios, as healthy households are less likely to be hit by catastrophic health 
care bills that can trigger personal bankruptcy. In line with this, the interaction variable obtains 
a negative coefficient of -0.001, but it is statistically insignificant. Regression 3 alternatively 
includes two interaction variables of Log exemption with both Log age and Health. Both of 
these interaction variables now obtain negative coefficients that are significant at the 1 percent 
and 5 percent levels, respectively. This suggests that the insignificance of the Health interaction 
variable in regression 2 is due to a positive left-our-variable bias of the estimated coefficient, 
given that the Health and Log age variables are negatively correlated. Overall, we find evidence 
that healthier households bias their investment portfolios less towards home equity with a view 
to obtain wealth insurance against bankruptcy through the homestead exemption. 
  Households that do not have a mortgage cannot adjust the balance of their mortgage to 
reach a target home equity share. Therefore, the home equity share is potentially less sensitive 
to the homestead exemption for households that do not have a mortgage. In regression 1 of 
Table 5, we restrict the sample to households without a mortgage yielding estimated 
coefficients for the Log exemption variable and its interaction with Log net worth of 0.042 and 
-0.003 that are both significant at the 5 percent level, and somewhat smaller in absolute value 
                                                 
17 It may also be the case that older households have more difficulty in obtaining home equity loans as a means 
to fine tune their home equity share.    
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than the corresponding estimates of 0.068 and -0.004 in regression 5 of Table 3. Thus, the 
impact of the exemption on the home equity share of households without a mortgage is 
relatively small at low levels of net worth, and it declines less with wealth. 
  Regression 2 instead is only estimated for households with a mortgage, with estimated 
coefficients for the Log exemption variable and its interaction with Log net worth of 0.081 and 
-0.004 that are significant at 1 percent, with the former estimate larger than the benchmark 
estimate of 0.068.  
  At the time of home purchase, households can use both the house value and the 
mortgage amount to approach their optimal home equity share, and hence the home equity 
share of households that bought their home more recently may be relatively sensitive to the 
home equity share. To test this, regression 3 limits the sample to households that have acquired 
their home less than 10 years previously. In this regression, the estimated coefficient of 0.083 
for the Log exemption variable is significant at 1 percent and larger than the benchmark value 
of 0.068, while its interaction with Log net worth obtains a coefficient of -0.004 that is 
significant at the 1 percent level as in the benchmark case. 
  The home equity share of younger households may be relatively responsive to the 
homestead exemption because of a combination of shorter house tenures and easier access to 
mortgage finance, for instance in the form of home equity loans. Regression 4 is estimated only 
for households with a household head younger than 55 years, yielding a relatively large 
estimated coefficient for the Log exemption variable of 0.077, even if the estimated coefficient 
for the interaction of the Log exemption and Log net worth variables is relatively small at -
0.003, with both coefficients significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, the home equity share of    
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younger households is relatively sensitive to the exemption at low levels of net worth, and this 
sensitivity declines relatively little with net worth. 
  The state-level exemption level is possibly endogenous to the home equity share, say on 
account of political pressures from home owners. Rising home equity shares could possibly 
lead to additional political demands from home owners for bankruptcy protection, giving rise to 
higher homestead exemptions. Hynes, Malani and Posner (2004) have considered several 
explanatory variables for the state-level homestead exemption on political grounds (including 
the individual bankruptcy rate, the number of banks per 100,000 population, and government 
transfers per capita), failing to find any statistically significant relation. These authors conclude 
that the best explanation for the current homestead exemption is the past exemption level, 
which is testimony to a high persistence of state-level homestead exemption policies. 
  This also suggests that to understand current state-level variation in homestead 
exemptions we have to go back to the historical reasons for their introduction. As documented 
by Goodman (1993), a main reason for the introduction of homestead exemptions in 19
th 
century America was to enable a state (or territory) to attract indebted settlers from other 
regions with the prospect of being able to establish a homestead out of reach of creditors. Texas 
introduced the first homestead law in 1839 to attract southern agriculturalists heavily burdened 
by debts following the depression of the late 1830s. Other Southern states soon retaliated with 
their own homestead exemption laws, starting with Georgia and Mississippi in 1841 (see 
Goodman (1993), Table 1). Historical homestead exemption levels thus can be seen as an 
equilibrium outcome of a game where states use exemption policies to attract additional 
settlers. In this equilibrium, relatively unattractive states need to institute relatively high 
homestead exemptions to be competitive to potential settlers.     
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Regions that were relatively unattractive to settlers required more time to acquire 
sufficient populations to officially become a US state. Thus, a state’s year of statehood is a 
useful index of a state’s attractiveness, and it should be positively correlated with the state 
exemption level. The correlation between Log statehood and Log exemption with data for 2000 
is calculated to be 0.36. In this calculation, we exclude DC, as according to the US constitution 
this is not a US state. Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of Log exemption against Log statehood 
again without DC, confirming a positive relation between these two variables. Among the early 
states, Delaware and Maryland have an Exemption of zero (and also a Log exemption of zero) 
in 2000. For states with unlimited exemption (Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas), we set exemption levels to 1 million US dollars and 
calculate Log exemption as ln(1,000,000) = 13.8 in 2000.  
In an instrumental variables regression, we use the log of the year of official statehood, 
denoted Log statehood, as an instrument for the homestead exemption level, with the results 
reported as regression 1 of Table 6. In this regression (as in all regressions), we exclude 
households located in DC. The IV regression includes year fixed effects, but no state fixed 
effects as the year of statehood is time-invariant. The Log exemption variable and its 
interaction with Log net worth obtain coefficient of 0.062 and -0.007, respectively, that are both 
significant at 1 percent. The F-test of excluded instruments is rejected at the 1 percent level, 
which suggests that Log statehood is an appropriate instrument for Log exemption. 
The homestead exemption potentially affects the home equity share of home owners as 
well as the earlier home ownership decision. To control for the potential impact of the 
homestead exemption on the selection of home owners, we estimate a Heckman two-stage 
selection model where the first stage concerns the selection of home owners, and the second    
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stage the home equity share of home owners. The selection variable is the household head’s 
marital status, reflected in the Married variable, as marriage can imply household stability and 
promote home ownership, even if married couples may not purchase different homes or finance 
them differently. In column 2, the exemption variable and its interaction with net worth obtain 
coefficients of 0.068 and -0.004 that are significant at the 1 percent level, and equal to the 
coefficients in the benchmark regression 5 of Table 3. This suggests that the selection issue 
does not bias regression coefficients for the exemption related variables in the benchmark 
regression.  
The corresponding selection regression is a probit regression with as a dependent 
variable the Own variable. The results of this first-stage regression are reported as column 3. 
The Married variable obtains a coefficient of 0.382 that is significant at the 1 percent level, to 
suggest that marriage increases home ownership. In the selection equation, the Log exemption 
variable and its interaction with Log net worth obtain coefficients of 0.023 and -0.001, 
respectively, that are both statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the finding that not 
controlling for the selection of households into home owners (as in the benchmark regression 5 
of Table 3) does not bias the estimated impact of the homestead exemption on the home equity 
share.  
To conclude the empirical section, Table 7 reports several additional probit regressions 
with the Own variable as the dependent variable. Regression 1 reports a regression similar to 
column 3 of Table 6, but it excludes the interaction of the Log exemption and Log net worth 
variables as well as the Log net worth, sq variable. The Log exemption variable continues to 
obtain a coefficient that is statistically insignificant.     
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Regression 1 includes state fixed effects, which means that the Log exemption variable 
can affect the home ownership decision through time variation in the value of the exemption, 
and through variation in the homestead exemption that comes about as households move 
between states. If we exclude the state fixed effects, the homestead exemption in addition 
potentially affects home ownership on account of cross-state variation in this variable, even if 
such a regression fails to control for any time-invariant state-level factors that may be relevant 
for the home ownership decision. After we exclude state fixed effects in regression 2, however, 
the homestead exemption fails to have a statistically significant impact on home ownership.  
The homestead exemption has a potentially more discernible impact on the home 
ownership decision of households that move between states, as these households tend to face 
rather different homestead exemption regimes during the years that they are included in the 
sample. To check this, we re-estimate regression 1 only for the sample of households that move 
between states, with the results reported as regression 3. The homestead exemption again fails 
to have a statistically significant impact on home ownership. Finally, we exclude state fixed 
effects from regression 3, and report the results as regression 4. Now the Log exemption 
variable obtains a coefficient of 0.018 that is significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, there is 
some limited evidence that the homestead exemption affects the home ownership decision. 
At first glance, it is somewhat surprising that there is only limited evidence that the 
homestead exemption affects the home ownership decision. After all, one expects the demand 
for wealth insurance against personal bankruptcy that is found to be a significant determinant of    
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the home equity share to also affect the demand for owning a home, as home ownership is a 
prerequisite for benefiting from the homestead bankruptcy exemption.
18  
A household, however, can unilaterally decide to alter its home equity share by repaying 
part or all of its mortgage (which is to say that the supply of mortgage credit to households is 
fully elastic in a downward way once a mortgage has been provided). Home ownership, 
instead, reflects the demand for generally mortgage-financed homes by households as well as 
the supply of mortgage finance. The exemption may have little impact on home ownership, 
because households that wish to purchase a home to protect against personal bankruptcy are the 
same households that face difficulty in financing a home purchase.
19  
 
6.  Conclusions 
  For many households, the home is the single most important asset. Thus, the share of 
household net worth that is allocated to home equity is a key aspect of household portfolio 
choice.  Recent contributions on the determination of housing in household portfolios have 
focused on the joint home ownership and housing consumption decision, and on high 
transaction costs that make the home investment decision special. Home equity investment is 
also special in that home equity tends to benefit from a favorable treatment in US personal 
bankruptcy law in the form of homestead exemptions. This paper is the first to examine how 
                                                 
18 In the model of section 3, households always invest a positive share of their wealth in asset H, which can be 
taken to mean that they always purchase a home. While this clearly is a simplification, it implies that the level 
of the exemption, if positive, does not affect the home ownership decision.  
19 The homestead exemption could affect home ownership through its impact on home purchases as well as 
through its impact on home retention for households that experience financial distress. Li and White (2009) and 
Li, White and Zhu (2009) argue that bankruptcy reform introduced in 2005 that limited the bankruptcy shield 
offered by homestead exemptions increased foreclosure rates.     
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homestead exemptions affect the home equity share in net worth using detailed US household 
data from the Survey of Income and Participation over the 1996-2006 period. 
  A one standard deviation increase in the homestead exemption level of $ 354,303 
starting from a level of zero is estimated to increase the share of home equity in total wealth for 
the average household by 22 percent (equal to about half a standard deviation), which is 
economically signficant. The positive relationship between the home equity share and the 
exemption level is more pronounced for households with low net worth, which potentially 
reflects that such households face a higher risk of bankruptcy. Similarly, the home equity share 
is more sensitive to the homestead exemption for households that report poor health, as these 
households may face a higher probability of high medical bills that can trigger personal 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, households with mortgage finance, with shorter house tenures, and 
with a younger household head tend to have home equity shares that are relatively sensitive to 
the homestead exemption level. These households may equally face higher probabilities of 
financial distress, but they may also have wider opportunities to adjust their home equity share 
either through a home purchase or change in the amount of mortgage debt.  
The results of a two-stage model of the home equity share (where the first stage 
concerns the home ownership decision) suggest that households that own their home adjust 
their home equity share to the homestead exemption level in a significant way, while there is no 
statistically significant relationship between home ownership and the homestead exemption. 
Only if we consider the sample of households that moved between states do we find some 
evidence that the homestead exemption positively affects the home ownership rate.  
The bias in household portfolios towards home equity induced by its special bankruptcy 
protection suggests that these portfolios are not efficient as they expose the household to too    
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much real estate risk in no-bankruptcy states. Wealth protection against personal bankruptcy 
may be desirable (as suggested, for instance, by Li and Sarte (2006) on the basis of a simulation 
model), but its provision through an exemption for home equity appears to be unnecessarily 
distorting household portfolio choice.  
An exemption for home equity could be rationalized if it were to influence home 
ownership, and if in addition home ownership produced positive externalities on neighborhood 
stability, as claimed by a substantial literature.
20  However, we do not find robust evidence that 
homestead exemptions affect home ownership. Thus, the costs of homestead exemptions in 
biasing household portfolios towards home equity are clear, while there are no obvious 
counterbalancing benefits of singling out home equity for special bankruptcy protection. 
This paper only documents the microeconomic cost of homestead exemptions in that 
household portfolios tend to be biased towards home equity. At the macroeconomic level, 
homestead exemptions potentially lead to biases as well. Any macroeconomic distortions 
depend on how increased demand for home equity at the micro level is accommodated at the 
macro level. Potential macroeconomic responses to higher homestead exemptions are higher 
average house prices and reduced aggregate mortgage financing demand in the short run, and 
increased housing construction in the long run. The macroeconomic implications of homestead 
exemption, however, are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Our results imply that homestead exemptions distort household asset portfolio without 
bringing about clear benefits in terms of increased home ownership. The paper therefore 
contributes to the policy debate about the desirability of homestead exemptions.
                                                 
20 Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), for instance, find a negative relation between home ownership and crime.    
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Table 1. Homestead exemptions by state in 1996 and 2000-2006 
 
  1996  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
State                 
                 
Alabama  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Alaska  54,000  62,000  64,800  64,800  64,800  67,500  67,500  67,500 
Arizona  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  150,000  150,000 
Arkansas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
California  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000 
Colorado  60,000  60,000  60,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000 
Connecticut  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
DC  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  Unlimited 
Delaware  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  50,000 
Florida  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Georgia  10,000  10,000  10,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000 
Hawaii  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Idaho  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000 
Illinois  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Indiana  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Iowa  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Kansas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Kentucky  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Louisiana  15,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000 
Maine  25,000  25,000  25,000  50,000  12,300  70,000  70,000  70,000 
Maryland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Massachusetts  100,000  100,000  100,000  300,000  300,000  500,000  500,000  500,000 
Michigan  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Minnesota  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
Mississippi  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
Missouri  8,000  8,000  8,000  8,000  8,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Montana  80,000  120,000  120,000  120,000  120,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
Nebraska  10,000  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500 
Nevada  125,000  125,000  125,000  125,000  125,000  200,000  200,000  350,000 
New Hampshire  60,000  60,000  60,000  100,000  100,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
New Jersey  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
New Mexico  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000 
New York  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  100,000 
North Carolina  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  37,000 
North Dakota  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000 
Ohio  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Oklahoma  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Oregon  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  30,000 
Pennsylvania  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Rhode Island  30,000  32,300  34,850  150,000  150,000  150,000  200,000  300,000 
South Carolina  30,000  32300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
South Dakota  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Tennessee  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500    
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Texas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Utah  10,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
Vermont  60,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
Virginia  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Washington  30,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
West Virginia  30,000  30,000  30,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000 
Wisconsin  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
Wyoming  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000 
                 
Federal exemption  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400    
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Table 2. Summary statistics of main variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the main regression variables. Own is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the household owns a home, and zero otherwise. Home equity is household home equity in US 
dollars. Net worth is total household net worth in US dollars. Log net worth is the natural logarithm of net 
worth. Home equity share is the ratio of home equity and net worth and is computed only for households with 
positive net worth. Age is the age of the household head. Log age is the natural logarithm of age. Health is a 
variable indicating the health status of the household head and ranges from a low health of 1 to a high health of 
5. Members is the number of individuals in the household. Married is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the household head is married, and zero otherwise. Moved state is an indicator that takes a value of one if 
a household physically moved to another state during the last year, and zero otherwise. Exemption is the state-
level homestead exemption in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption levels equal to 1 million US dollars in 
2000, and adjust this amount for inflation in other years. Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption 
plus one. Statehood is the year that a state officially became a US state. Log statehood is the natural logarithm 
of statehood. Appreciation is the annual percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house price 
index.  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
Own  276,791  0.673  0.469  0  1 
Home equity  276,791  63,745  98,311  -299,624  813,619 
Net worth  276,791  155,671  1,009,251  -10,700,000  212,000,000 
Log net worth  231,501  10.885  1.955  -0.158  19.172 
Home equity share  231,501  0.517  0.462  0  2.469 
Age  276,791  49.881  17.004  15  88 
Log age  276,791  3.849  0.356  2.708  4.477 
Health  276,791  3.557  1.137  1  5 
Log age  276,791  3.849  0.356  2.708  4.477 
Members  276,791  2.592  1.492  1  17 
Married  276,791  0.529  0.499  0  1 
Moved state  168,673  0.065  0.247  0  1 
Exemption  276,791  208,066  354,303  0  1,097,514 
Log  exemption  271,018  10.726  1.200  8.765  13.030 
Appreciation  276,791  0.038  0.040  -0.089  0.224 
Statehood  276,791  1,827.331  36.344  1787  1,959 
Log of statehood  276,791  7.510  0.020  7.488  7.580 
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Table 3. Homestead exemptions and investments in home equity 
 
Dependent variable is the home equity share which is the ratio of home equity and net worth and is computed 
only for households with positive net worth. Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption plus one 
where exemption is the state-level homestead exemption l in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption levels 
equal to 1 million US dollars in 2000, and adjust this amount for inflation in other years. Appreciation is the 
annual percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house price index. Log age is the natural logarithm 
of the age of the household head. Health is a variable indicating the health status of the household head and 
ranges from a low health of 1 to a high health of 5. Members is the number of individuals in the household. Log 
net worth is the natural logarithm of net worth. Log net worth, sq is the square of the natural logarithm of net 
worth. Regression 6 reports results only for households with wealth more than US$500,000. Regression 7 
reports results only for households with wealth less than US$500,000.All regressions exclude observations from 
DC. Regressions in columns 2 to 7 also exclude households that do not own a house. Regressions include state 
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at the household level. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




               
Log exemption  0.017***  0.018***  0.025***  0.026***  0.068***  0.006  0.029*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Appreciation  0.267***  0.329***  0.481***  0.489***  0.490***  0.422***  0.477*** 
  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.059)  (0.040) 
Log age  0.206***  -0.121***  0.138***  0.141***  0.140***  0.105***  0.142*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Health  -0.008***  -0.055***  -0.014***  -0.013***  -0.013***  0.003  -0.014*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Members  0.041***  0.004***  0.014***  0.014***  0.014***  0.008***  0.014*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Log net worth      -0.156***  0.052***  0.090***  -1.284***  0.053*** 
      (0.001)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.047)  (0.020) 
Log net worth, 
sq 









*Log net worth 
        -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
   
               
State fixed 
effects 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed 
effects 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  226,600  172,680  172,680  172,680  172,680  18,032  154,648 
R-squared  0.039  0.029  0.235  0.240  0.241  0.305  0.173    
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Table 4. Homestead exemptions and investments in home equity: interactions 
 
Dependent variable is the home equity share which is the ratio of home equity and net worth and is computed 
only for households with positive net worth. Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption plus one 
where exemption is the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption levels equal 
to 1 million US dollars in 2000, and adjust this amount for inflation in other years. Appreciation is the annual 
percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house price index. Log age is the natural logarithm of the 
age of the household head. Health is a variable indicating the health status of the household head and ranges 
from a low health of 1 to a high health of 5. Members is the number of individuals in the household. Log net 
worth is the natural logarithm of net worth. Log net worth, sq is the square of the natural logarithm of net worth. 
Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Regressions exclude households that do not own a house and 
observations from DC. Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
corrected for clustering at the household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Log exemption  0.087***  0.070***  0.100*** 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Appreciation  0.490***  0.490***  0.489*** 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Log age  0.206***  0.141***  0.234*** 
  (0.026)  (0.005)  (0.028) 
Health  -0.013***  -0.006  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Members  0.014***  0.014***  0.014*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log net worth  0.086***  0.090***  0.083*** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Log net worth, sq  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.009*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 








Log exemption*Log age  -0.006***    -0.009*** 
  (0.002)    (0.003) 
Log Exemption*Health    -0.001  -0.002** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
State fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  172,680  172,680  172,680 
R-squared  0.241  0.241  0.241 
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Table 5. Homestead exemptions and investments in home equity: subsamples 
 
Dependent variable is the home equity share which is the ratio of home equity and net worth and is computed 
only for households with positive net worth. Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption plus one 
where exemption is the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption levels equal 
to 1 million US dollars in 2000, and adjust this amount for inflation in other years. Appreciation is the annual 
percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house price index. Log age is the natural logarithm of the 
age of the household head. Health is a variable indicating the health status of the household head and ranges 
from a low health of 1 to a high health of 5. Members is the number of individuals in the household. Log net 
worth is the natural logarithm of net worth. Log net worth, sq is the square of the natural logarithm of net worth. 
Regression 1 reports results only for households that own a house but have no mortgage. Regression 2 reports 
results only for households that own a house but have a mortgage. Regression 3 reports results only for 
households that own a house but with home tenure less than 10 years. Regression 4 reports results only for 
households that own a house but with age less than 55. Regressions exclude observations from DC. Regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at the 
household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 









         
Log exemption  0.042**  0.081***  0.083***  0.077*** 
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015) 
Appreciation  0.086  0.781***  0.883***  0.695*** 
  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.053) 
Log age  0.067***  0.119***  0.068***  0.116*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Health  -0.013***  -0.008***  -0.016***  -0.013*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Members  0.020***  0.014***  0.010***  0.014*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log net worth  0.404***  -0.127***  -0.212***  0.000 
  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.024) 
Log net worth, sq  -0.022***  -0.001  0.004***  -0.006*** 











         
State fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  68,473  104,207  71,939  96,982 
R-squared  0.259  0.262  0.261  0.204 
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Table 6. Homestead exemptions and investments in home equity: endogeneity and selection 
 
Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption where exemption is the state-level homestead exemption 
in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption levels equal to 1 million US dollars in 2000, and adjust this amount 
for inflation in other years. Appreciation is the annual percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO 
house price index. Log age is the natural logarithm of the age of the household head.  Health is a variable 
indicating the health status of the household head and ranges from a low health of 1 to a high health of 5. 
Members is the number of individuals in the household. Log net worth is the natural logarithm of net worth. 
Log net worth, sq is the square of the natural logarithm of net worth. Married is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the individual is married, and zero otherwise. Lambda is Heckman’s lambda. Regression in 
column 1 is an IV regression with log of statehood as instrument for log exemption, and the interaction between 
log of statehood and log of net worth as instrument for log exemption and log net worth. Dependent variable is 
the home equity share which is the ratio of home equity and net worth and is computed only for households 
with positive net worth. Column 2 reports the two-stage regression results of a Heckman selection model with 
home equity share as dependent variable and with Married as selection variable. Column 3 reports the 
corresponding first-stage regression results of the Heckman selection model with Married as selection variable 
and home ownership dummy variable as dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected 
for clustering at the household level (except in Heckman model). Regressions exclude observations from DC. 
Regressions 2 and 3 include state effects, and regressions 2-3 include state effects.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  IV, Statehood  Heckman  Own, 
Selection 
       
Log exemption  0.062***  0.068***  0.023 
  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.026) 
Appreciation  1.132***  0.499***  -0.466*** 
  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.138) 
Log age  0.140***  0.122***  0.480*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
Health  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.023*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Members  0.015***  0.008***  0.088*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Log net worth  0.115***  -0.029**  0.839*** 
  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.026) 
Log net worth, sq  -0.008***  -0.005***  -0.015*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 








Married      0.382*** 
      (0.009) 
Lambda    -0.126***   
    (0.011)   
State fixed effects  N  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Instruments  Log statehood, Log 
statehood*Log net 
worth 
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F-test of excluded 
instruments (p-value) 
0.000***     
       
Observations  172,680  226,600  226,600 
Censored observations    53,920  53,920 
Uncensored observations    172,680  172,680 
R-squared  0.224        
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Table 7. Homestead exemptions and home ownership 
 
Dependent variable is home ownership dummy variable. Log exemption is the natural logarithm of exemption 
plus one where exemption is the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars. We set unlimited exemption 
levels equal to 1 million US dollars in 2000, and adjust this amount for inflation in other years. Appreciation is 
the annual percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house price index. Log age is the natural 
logarithm of the age of the household head.  Health is a variable indicating the health status of the household 
head and ranges from a low health of 1 to a high health of 5. Members is the number of individuals in the 
household. Log net worth is the natural logarithm of net worth. Results based on probit regressions. Sample in 
regressions 3 and 4 only includes households that moved states. Regressions exclude observations from DC. 
Regressions 1 and 3 include state effects, and all regressions include year effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, corrected for clustering at the household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables      Moved state  Moved state 
         
Log exemption  0.006  0.002  -0.132  0.018* 
  (0.024)  (0.003)  (0.092)  (0.011) 
Appreciation  -0.493***  -3.649***  -0.224  -3.101*** 
  (0.168)  (0.131)  (0.713)  (0.518) 
Log age  0.462***  0.448***  0.477***  0.459*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.055)  (0.053) 
Health  -0.024***  -0.036***  -0.049***  -0.060*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Members  0.088***  0.080***  0.079***  0.070*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Log net worth  0.536***  0.519***  0.474***  0.459*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Married  0.378***  0.387***  0.295***  0.308*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.0392)  (0.0386) 
         
State fixed effects  Y  N  Y  N 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 





    









Figure 1. Housing with and without bankruptcy protection 
 
This figure plots housing investment, H, against wealth, W. The P and NP schedules represent points where 




   
 
 
    









Figure 2. The relation between housing and wealth 
 












    








Panel B. Strong preferences for housing consumption    
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Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable  Description  Sources 
Own  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household owns a home, 
and zero otherwise. 
SIPP 
Home equity  Household  home equity in US dollars  SIPP 
Net worth  Total household net worth in US dollars  SIPP 
Home equity share  Ratio of home equity and net worth and computed only for households 
with positive net worth 
SIPP 
Age  Age of household head  SIPP 
Health  Variable indicating the health status of the household head ranging from 
a low health of 1 to a high health of 5 
SIPP 
Members  Number of individuals in the household  SIPP 
Married  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual is married, 
and zero otherwise. 
SIPP 
Moved state  Indicator for whether the household physically moved to another state 
during the last year 
SIPP 
Exemption  State-level homestead exemption level in US dollars. We set unlimited 
exemption levels equal to 1 million US dollars in 2000 and adjust this 
amount for inflation in other years 
Elias, Renauer and Leonard, 
various years 
Appreciation  Annual percentage change in the deflated state-level house price index.  Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight 
Statehood  Year in which a state officially became a US state  Wikipedia
21 
 
                                                 
21 See 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:m8BkF2zdiAsJ:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_date_of_statehood+list+of+U.S.+s
tates+by+date+of+statehood&cd=1&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl 
 